We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two-dimensional heterogeneous resource among several agents with different preferences. Potential applications include dividing land-estates among heirs, museum space among presenters or space in print and electronic media among advertisers. Classic cake-cutting procedures either consider a one-dimensional resource, or allocate each agent a collection of disconnected pieces. In practice, however, the two-dimensional shape of the allotted piece is of crucial importance in many applications. For example, when building houses or designing advertisements, in order to be useful, the allotments should be squares or rectangles with bounded aspect-ratio. We thus introduce the problem of fair two-dimensional division wherein the allocated piece must have a pre-specified geometric shape. We present constructive cake-cutting procedures that satisfy the two most prominent fairness criteria, namely envy-freeness and proportionality. In scenarios where proportionality cannot be achieved due to the geometric constraints, our procedures provide a partially-proportional division, guaranteeing that the fraction allocated to each agent be at least a certain positive constant. We prove that in many natural scenarios the envy-freeness requirement is compatible with the best attainable partial-proportionality. JEL classification: D63
Introduction
Fair cake-cutting is an active field of research with various applications. A prominent application is division of land (e.g. Berliant and Raa [8] , Berliant et al. [9] , Legut et al. [28] , Chambers [14] , Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni [17] , Hüsseinov [22] , Nicolò et al. [33] ). The basic setting considers a heterogeneous good, such as a land-estate, to be divided among several agents. The agents may have different preferences over the possible pieces of the good, e.g. one agent prefers the forests while the other prefers the sea shore. The goal is to divide the good among the agents in a way deemed "fair". The common fairness criterion in economics is Envy-freeness, which means that no agent prefers getting a piece allotted to another agent.
Envy-freeness on its own is trivially satisfied by the empty allocation. The task becomes more interesting when envy-freeness is combined with an efficiency criterion. The most common such criterion is Pareto efficiency. Indeed, Weller [48] has proved that, when the agents' preferences (a) (b) (c) Figure 1 : A square land-estate has to be divided between two people. The land-estate is mostly barren, except for three water-pools (discs). The agents have the same preferences: each agent wants a square land-plot with as much water as possible. The squares must not overlap. Hence: (a) It is impossible to give both agents more than 1/3 of the water. Hence: (b) An envy-free division must give each agent at most 1/3 of the water.
(c) But such a division cannot be Pareto-efficient since it is dominated by a division which gives one agent 1/3 and the other 2/3 of the water.
are represented by non-atomic measures, there always exists a competitive-equilibrium with equalincomes, and the equilibrium allocation is both Pareto-efficient and envy-free. However, Weller's equilibrium allocation gives no guarantees about the geometric shape of the allotted pieces. A "piece" in his allocation might even be a union of a countable number of disconnected cake-bits. So, Weller's positive result is valid only when the agents' preferences ignore the geometry of their allotted pieces. While such preferences may make sense when dividing an actual edible cake, they are not so sensible when dividing land. Many authors have noted the importance of imposing some geometric constraints on the pieces. The most common constraint is connectivity -each agent should receive a single connected piece rather than a possibly infinite collection thereof. The cake is usually assumed to be the one-dimensional interval [0, 1] and the allotted pieces are sub-intervals (e.g. Stromquist [43] , Su [45] , Nicolò and Yu [34] , Azrieli and Shmaya [3] ). This is usually justified by the reasoning that higher dimensional settings can always be projected onto one dimension, and hence fairness in one dimension implies fairness in higher dimensions. However, projecting back from the one dimension, the resulting two-dimensional plots are thin rectangular slivers, of little use in most practical applications; it is hard to build a house on a 10 × 1, 000 meter plot even though its area is a full hectare, and a thin 0.1-inch wide advertisement space would ill-serve most advertises regardless of its height.
Berliant and Dunz [7] have studied a multi-dimensional cake model. Their results are mostly negative: when general value measures are combined with geometric preferences, a competitiveequilibrium might not exist. In fact, even regardless of competitive-equilibrium, a Pareto-efficientenvy-free allocation might not exist, as we show in Figure 1 .
Thus, to get an envy-free allocation among agents with geometric preferences, we must replace Pareto-efficiency with a different efficiency criterion. A natural candidate is proportionality -every agent should receive at least 1/n of the total cake value. This was the first fairness criterion studied in the context of cake-cutting [42] and it is still very common in the cake-cutting literature [37, 35] . Since with geometric preferences, a proportional division does not always exist (see Figure 1) , we relax the proportionality requirement and consider partial proportionality. Partial proportionality means that each agent receives a piece worth at least a fraction p of the total cake-value, where p is a positive constant, 0 < p ≤ 1/n. Obviously we would like p to be as large as possible. In a previous paper [41] , we showed that partial-proportionality can be attained in various geometric settings. For example, in the setting of Figure 1 (square cake and two agents who want square pieces), each agent can be guaranteed at least a fraction 1/4 of the total cake-value, and this is the largest fraction that can be guaranteed. However, these results did not consider envy. This raises the following question, which is at the heart of the present paper:
When each agent wants a piece with a given geometric shape, what is the largest fraction of the cake-value that can be guaranteed to every agent in an envy-free allocation?
The following example shows that existing cake-cutting procedures are insufficient for answering this question. Example 1.1. You and a partner are going to divide a square land-estate. It is 100-by-100 square meters and its western side is adjacent to the sea. Your desire is to build a house near the seashore. You decide to use the classic procedure for envy-free division: "You cut, I choose". You let your partner divide the land to two plots, knowing that you have the right to choose the plot that is more valuable according to your personal preferences. Your partner makes a cut parallel to the shoreline at a distance of only 1 meter from the sea. 6 Which of the two plots would you choose? The western plot contains a lot of sea shore, but it is so narrow that it has no room for building anything. On the other hand, the eastern plot is large but does not contain any shore land. Whichever plot you choose, the division is not proportional for you, because your utility is far less than half the utility of the original land estate.
Of course the cake could be cut in a more sensible way (e.g. by a line perpendicular to the sea), but the current division procedures say nothing about how exactly the cake should be cut in each situation in order to guarantee that the division is fair in a way that respects the geometric preferences. While the cut-and-choose procedure still guarantees envy-freeness, it does not guarantee partial-proportionality since it does not guarantee any positive utility to agents who want square pieces.
This paper presents cake-cutting procedures that guarantee both envy-freeness and partialproportionality. Our procedures focus on agents who want fat pieces -pieces with a bounded length/width ratio, such as squares. The rationale is that a fat shape is more convenient to work with, build on, cultivate, etc. 1 fat 2 fat 2 fat √ 2 fat 3 fat Figure 2 : Fatness of several 2-dimensional geometric shapes. The dashed square is the largest contained cube; the dotted square is the smallest containing parallel cube. The shape is R-fat if the ratio of the side-lengths of these squares is at most R.
Note that the fatness requirement is inherently multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a 1-dimensional requirement. Hence it cannot be satisfied by methods developed for a 1-dimensional cake. 7 
Results
We prove that envy-freeness and partial-proportionality are compatible in progressively more general geometric scenarios. Our proofs are constructive: in every geometric scenario (geometric shape of the cake and preferred shape of the pieces), we present a procedure that divides the cake with the following guarantees:
• Envy-freeness: every agent weakly prefers his/her allotted piece over the piece given to any other agent.
• Partial-proportionality: every agent receives a piece worth for him at least a fraction p of his total cake-value, where p is a positive constant that depends on the geometric requirements.
In the following theorems, the partial-proportionality guarantee p is given in parentheses.
Theorem 1. When dividing a cake to two agents, there is a procedure for finding an envy-free and partially-proportional allocation in the following cases: (a) The cake is square and the usable pieces are squares (p ≥ 1/4).
(b) The cake is an R-fat rectangle and the usable pieces are R-fat rectangles, where R ≥ 2 (p ≥ 1/3).
(c) The cake is an arbitrary R-fat object and the pieces are 2R-fat, where R ≥ 1 (p ≥ 1/2).
Value-shape trade-off : Theorem 1 illustrates a multiple-way trade-off between value and shape. Consider two agents who want to divide a square land-estate with no envy. They have the following options:
• By projecting a 1-dimensional division obtained by any classic cake-cutting procedure, they can achieve a proportional allocation (a value of at least 1/2) with rectangular pieces but with no bound on the aspect ratio -the pieces might be arbitrarily thin. 7 In contrast, the simpler requirement that the pieces be rectangles with an arbitrary length/width ratio can easily be reduced to a 1-dimensional requirement that the pieces are connected intervals. Such reduction is also possible for the requirements that the pieces be simplexes [24] or polytopes [17] with an unbounded aspect ratio.
• By (a), they can achieve an allocation with square pieces but only partial proportionalitythe proportionality might be as low as 1/4.
• By (b), they can achieve a proportionality of 1/3 with 2-fat rectangles, which is a compromise between the previous two options.
• By (c), they can achieve an allocation that is both proportional and with 2-fat pieces, but the pieces might be non rectangular.
The proportionality constants in Theorem 1 are tight in the following sense: it is not possible to guarantee an allocation with a larger proportionality, even if envy is allowed. This means that envyfreeness is compatible with the largest possible proportionality -we don't have to compromise on proportionality to prevent envy. Our second theorem extends these results to any number of agents.
Theorem 2. When dividing a cake to n agents, there is a procedure for finding an envy-free and partially-proportional allocation in the following cases: (a) The cake is square and the usable pieces are squares (p ≥ 1/(4n 2 )).
The cake is an R-fat rectangle and the usable pieces are R-fat rectangles, where
(c) The cake is a d-dimensional R-fat object and the pieces are
Value-shape trade-off : Part (a) and part (c) are duals in the following sense:
• Part (a) guarantees an envy-free division with perfect pieces (squares) but compromises on the proportionality level;
• Part (c) guarantees an envy-free division with perfect proportionality (1/n) but compromises on the fatness of the pieces.
The "magnitude" of the first compromise is 4n, since the proportionality drops from 1/n to 1/(4n 2 ). We do not know if this magnitude is tight: we know that it is possible to attain a division with square pieces and a proportionality of 1/O(n) which is not necessarily envy-free [41] , but we do not know if a proportionality of 1/O(n) is compatible with envy-freeness. The "magnitude" of the second compromise is ⌈n 1/d ⌉. This magnitude is asymptotically tight. We prove that, in order to guarantee a proportional division of an R-fat cake, with or without envy, we must allow the pieces to be Ω(n 1/d )R-fat.
Challenges and solutions
The main challenge in two-dimensional cake-cutting is that utility functions that depend on geometric shape are not additive. For example, consider an agent who wants to build a square house the utility of which is determined by its area. The utility of this agent from a 20 × 20 plot is 400, but if this plot is divided to two 20 × 10 plots, the utility from each plot is 100 and the sum of utilities is only 200. Most existing procedures for proportional cake-cutting assume that the valuations are additive, so they are not applicable in our case. While there are some previous works on cake-cutting with non-additive utilities, they too cannot handle geometric constraints:
8 ⌈x⌉ denotes the ceiling of x -the smallest integer which is larger than x.
• Berliant et al. [9] , Maccheroni and Marinacci [30] focus on sub-additive, or concave, utility functions, in which the sum of the utilities of the parts is more than the utility of the whole. These utility functions are inapplicable in our scenario because, as illustrated in the previous paragraph, utility functions that consider geometry are not necessarily sub-additive -the sum of the utilities of the parts might be less than the utility of the whole.
• Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni [17] do not explicitly require sub-additivity, but they require preference for concentration: if an agent is indifferent between two pieces X and Y, then he prefers 100% of X to 50% of X plus 50% of Y. This axiom may be incompatible with geometric constraints: the agent in the above example is indifferent between the two 20 × 10 rectangles, but he prefers 50% of their union (the 20 × 20 square) to 100% of a single rectangle. 9
• Sagara and Vlach [39] , Hüsseinov and Sagara [23] consider general non-additive utility functions but provide only non-constructive existence proofs.
• Su [45] , Caragiannis et al. [13] , Mirchandani [32] provide practical division procedures for non-additive utilities, but they crucially assume that the cake is a 1-dimensional interval and cannot handle two-dimensional constraints.
When envy-free division protocols are applied to agents with non-additive utility functions, the division is still envy-free, but the utility per agent might be arbitrarily small. This is true for cut-and-choose (as shown in Example 1.1 above) and it is also true for all other procedures for envy-free division that we are aware of (Stromquist [43] [2] ). Our way to cope with this challenge is to explicitly handle the geometric constraints in the procedures. The main tool we use is the geometric knife function.
Moving-knife procedures have been used for envy-free cake-cutting since its earliest years [19, 43, 12, 38] . For example, consider the following simple procedure for envy-free division among two agents. A referee moves a knife slowly over the cake, from left to right. Whenever an agent feels that the piece to the left of the knife is worth for him exactly half the total cake value, he shouts "stop!". Then, the cake is cut at the current knife location, the shouter receives the piece to its left and the non-shouter receives the piece to its right.
In this paper we formalize the notion of a knife and add geometric constraints guaranteeing that the final pieces have both the desired geometric shape and a sufficiently high value.
Related work
The prominent model in the cake-cutting literature assumes that the cake is an interval. Several authors diverge from the interval model by assuming a circular cake (e.g. Thomson [46] , Brams et al. [10] , Barbanel et al. [5] ), but they still work in one dimension so the pieces are one-dimensional arcs corresponding to thin wedge-like slivers.
The importance of the multi-dimensional geometric shape of the plots was noted by several authors.
Hill [21], Beck [6] , Webb [47] , Berliant et al. [9] study the problem of dividing a disputed territory between several bordering countries, with the constraint that each country should get a piece that is adjacent to its border.
Ichiishi and Idzik [24] , Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni [17] require the plots to be convex shapes such as multi-dimensional simplexes. However, there are no restrictions on the allocated simplexes and apparently these can be arbitrarily thin. Additionally, the proofs are purely existential.
Iyer and Huhns [25] describe a procedure for giving each agent a rectangular plot with an aspect ratio determined by the agent. Their procedure asks each of the n agents to draw n disjoint rectangles on the map of the two-dimensional cake. These rectangles are supposed to represent the "desired areas" of the agent. The procedure tries to give each agent one of his n desired areas. However, it does not succeed unless each rectangle proposed by an individual intersects at most one other rectangle drawn by any other agent. If even a single rectangle of Alice intersects two rectangles of George (for example), then the procedure fails and no agent gets any piece.
In a related paper [41] we considered the problem of partially-proportional division when the pieces must be squares or fat rectangles. We presented a procedure for dividing a square cake among n agents such that each agent receives a square piece with a value of at least 1/(4n − 4). When all agents have the same value function, the proportionality improves to 1/(2n). We also proved that the upper bound in both cases is 1/(2n). The procedures in the present paper use very different techniques, which guarantee envy-freeness in addition to partial-proportionality. Their down-side is that their proportionality guarantee (in the case of square pieces) is only 1/(4n 2 ). Additionally, in the present paper we handle general fat objects rather than just squares and rectangles. Some of the upper bounds on partial-proportionality are replicated from that paper to make the current paper stand alone (Appendix B). Each of the two papers can be fully understood without reading the other one.
Paper structure
The paper proceeds as follows. The formal definitions and model are provided in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the core geometric concepts and techniques. These geometric techniques are then applied in the construction of the envy-free division procedures for two agents (Section 4) and n agents (Section 5). Some directions for future work are presented in Section 6.
Model and Terminology
The cake C is a Borel subset of a Euclidean space R d . In most of the paper d = 2. Pieces are Borel subsets of R d . Pieces of C are Borel subsets of C.
There is a family S of pieces that are considered usable. An S-piece is an element of S. There are n ≥ 1 agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} has a value-density function v i , which is an integrable, non-negative and bounded function on C. In the context of land division, the valuedensity function represents the quality of each land-spot in the eyes of the agent. It may depend upon factors such as the fertility of soil, the probability of finding oil, the existence of trees, etc.
The value of a piece X to agent i is marked by V i (X) and it is the integral of the value-density:
We assume that for all agents i, V i (C) < ∞. Hence each V i is a finite measure and it is absolutelycontinuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on C.
In the standard cake-cutting model [48, 14, 29, 15] , the utility function of an agent is identical to his/her value measure. The present paper diverges from this model by considering agents whose utility functions depend both on value and on geometric shape. We assume that an agent can derive utility only from an S-piece; when his allotted land-plot is not an S-piece, he selects the most valuable S-piece contained therein and utilizes it. For each agent i, we define the S-value function, which assigns to each piece X the value of the most valuable usable piece contained therein:
We assume that the utility of agent i is equal to his S-value function V S i . In general, V S i is not a measure since it is not additive (it is not even sub-additive). Hence, cake-cutting procedures that require additivity are not applicable. Note that the two most common cake-cutting models are special cases of our model:
• The model in which each agent may receive an arbitrary Borel subset [48] is a special case in which S is the set of all Borel subsets of C.
• The model in which each agent must receive a connected piece [43] is a special case in which C is an interval and S is the set of intervals.
When the utilities of all agents are determined by S-value functions, we can restrict our attention to allocations in which each agent receives an S-piece. An S-allocation is a vector of n S-pieces X = (X 1 , ..., X n ), one piece per agent, such that the X i are pairwise-disjoint and their union is contained in C. We express the latter two facts succinctly using the "disjoint union" operator, ⊔:
Some parts of the cake may remain unallocated -free disposal is assumed. An S-allocation X is called envy-free if the utility of an agent from his allocated S-piece is at least as large as his utility from every piece allocated to another agent:
In addition to envy-freeness, an allocation is assessed by the the fraction of the total cake value that is given to each agent. An allocation is called proportional if every agent receives a piece worth for him at least 1/n of the total cake value. Since a proportional S-allocation does not always exist (see e.g. Figure 1 ), we define: Definition 2.1. (a) For a cake C, a family of usable pieces S and an integer n ≥ 1, the envy-free proportionality of C, S and n, marked PropEF(C, S, n), is the largest fraction p ∈ [0, 1] such that, for every set of n value measures (V i , ..., V n ), there exists an envy-free S-allocation (X 1 , ..., X n ) for which: 10 ∀i :
The proportionality of C, S and n, marked Prop(C, S, n), in defined exactly the same way, with the only difference being that all allocations are considered, rather than just the envy-free ones. 11
10 Shortly: PropEF(C, S, n) = infV sup X mini Vi(Xi)/Vi(C), where the infimum is on all combinations of n value measures (V1, ..., Vn), the supremum is on all envy-free S-allocations (X1, ..., Xn) and the minimum is on all agents i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
11 Note that the denominator in the proportionality definition is Vi(C) -the value of the entire cake. This means that even for a single agent the proportionality might be less than 1 (e.g, if the cake is non-square but the agent wants a square piece; see examples in Subsection 3.1). Alternatively, we could define the proportionality with the denominator being V S i (C) -the S-value of the entire cake. Then, the proportionality for a single agent would always be 1. We explored this alternative in our other paper [41] but decided to suppress it in the present paper for the sake of brevity.
Obviously, because the supremum in PropEF(C, S, n) is taken over a smaller set:
This means that, in theory, if we want to guarantee that there is no envy, we may have to "pay" in terms of proportionality. One of the goals of the present research is to study if and how much we may have to pay.
Classic cake-cutting results imply that for every cake C:
where All is the collection of all Borel subsets of C. That is: when all pieces are usable, every cake can be divided among every group of n agents in an envy-free allocation in which the utility of each agent is at least 1/n. Our challenge in the rest of this paper will be to establish bounds on PropEF(C, S, n) for various combinations of C and S. All our possibility results (lower bounds) are on PropEF(C, S, n) and therefore are also valid for Prop(C, S, n); similarly, all our impossibility results (upper bounds) are for Prop(C, S, n) and therefore are also valid for PropEF(C, S, n).
Strategy considerations: For the sake of simplicity, we present our division procedures as if all agents act according to their true value functions. However, the guarantees of the procedures are valid for any single agent who acts according to his own value function. E.g, the procedure of Theorem 2(c) guarantees that every agent acting according to his true value function receives a piece with a utility of at least 1/n and at least as good as the other pieces, regardless of what the other agents do. This is the common practice in the cake-cutting world.
Geometric Preliminaries
Example 1.1 illustrates that, in order to achieve a fair division that respects the geometric preferences, we should constrain the ways in which agents are allowed to cut the cake. This requires several definitions of geometric concepts, which are the topic of the present section.
Geometric loss
A key geometric concept in our analysis is the geometric loss -the maximum factor by which the utility of an agent can be reduced by his insistence on using pieces only from family S. Definition 3.1. For a piece C and family of usable pieces S, the geometric loss factor of C relative to S is:
where the supremum is over all finite absolutely-continuous value measures V having V S (C) > 0. If there is no supremum, then we write Loss(C, S) = ∞.
When C ∈ S the loss is 1, which means is no loss, since in this case V S (C) = V (C). When C / ∈ S, the loss is generally larger than 1. For example, if C is a 30-by-20 rectangle. The largest square contained in C is 20-by-20. Hence, if the value density is uniform over C (as in Figure 3 /a), then
, implying that Loss(C, Squares) ≥ 3/2. But the loss may be larger: suppose V is uniform over the right and left sides of C (as in Figure 3 /b). In this case
= 2, implying that Loss(C, Squares) ≥ 2. As we will see in Subsection 3.3, the loss in this case is exactly 2, and a.
Loss(C, S) = ∞ Figure 3 : Geometric loss factors relative to the family of squares.
in general the loss of a rectangle with a length/width ratio of L is ⌈L⌉; a thinner rectangle has a larger loss. For some combinations of C and S, the geometric loss factor might be infinite. For example, if C is a circle and that V is nonzero only in a very narrow strip near the perimeter (as in Figure 3 /c), any square contained in C intersects the valuable strip only in the corners. and the intersection might be arbitrarily small. Hence, V S (C) might be arbitrarily small and Loss(C, Squares) = ∞.
Chooser Lemma
We now relate the geometric loss factor to cake partitions. Our goal is to prove that, if a cake is partitioned such that the sum of the geometric losses of its parts is sufficiently small, then an agent can choose at least one part with a large value. Formally: Lemma 3.2. For every cake C, integer m, partition X 1 ⊔· · ·⊔X m = C, family S and value measure V :
Proof. Denote the denominator in the right-hand side by:
Loss(X i , S)
By additivity of V :
Multiply both sides of (1) by the Loss(X,
By the pigeonhole principle, at least one of the m summands in the left-hand side must be greater than or equal to the corresponding summand in the right-hand side. I.e., there exists j for which: 
Combining the above two inequalities yields:
which is equivalent to:
Motivated by the Chooser Lemma and its proof, we define the expression Loss(X, S) := m i=1 Loss(X i , S) as the geometric loss of the partition X. The Chooser Lemma implies that smaller geometric-loss is better for the chooser. This is easy to see in Example 1.1, where a 100-by-100 land-estate is divided using cut-and-choose:
• A partition to 100-by-1 and 100-by-99 rectangles has a geometric loss of 102 (the loss of the 100-by-1 sliver is 100 and the loss of the 100-by-99 rectangle is 2). Hence, the utility guarantee for a chooser who wants square pieces is only 1/102.
• In contrast, a partition to two 100-by-50 rectangles has a geometric loss of 4 (2+2). By Lemma 3.2, the chooser can always get a square with a utility of at least 1/4.
We will often use this simple implication of the Chooser Lemma:
. Suppose a cake-partition has a geometric loss of at most M . Each of two agents chooses a best piece, and the choices are different. Then the resulting allocation is envy-free, and each agent's value is at least 1/M of the total cake-value.
Cover Numbers and Cover Lemma
Since smaller geometric loss is better, it is useful to have an upper bound on the geometric loss.
Definition 3.4. For a cake C and family S, CoverN um(C, S) is the smallest number of S-pieces whose union is exactly C.
Some examples are depicted in Figure 4 .
Lemma 3.5. For every cake C and family S:
Proof. Let m = CoverNum(C, S). By definition of CoverNum, there are m S-pieces X 1 , ..., X m , possibly overlapping, that cover the cake C:
Let V be any value measure. By additivity:
By the pigeonhole principle, there is at least one piece X i ∈ S with:
On the other hand, since X i is an S-piece contained in C, its value is bounded by the supremum V S :
Combining this into the definition Loss(C,
, yields:
Loss(C,S) . By Lemma 3.5, this implies
CoverNum(C,S) . Thus, for example, in the 30×20 rectangle of Figure 3 , CoverNum(C, Squares) = 2 so Loss(C, Squares) ≤ 2 so V S (C) ≥ V (C)/2. This means that every agent, with any value measure, can get from C a utility of at least half its total value.
Knife functions
Moving knives have been used to cut cakes ever since the seminal paper of Dubins and Spanier [19] . We generalize the concept of a moving knife to handle geometric shape constraints. Definition 3.6. Given a cake C, a knife function on C is a function K C from the real interval [0, 1] to Borel subsets of C with the following monotonicity property: for every
The complement of K C , marked K C , is defined by:
Some examples are shown in Figure 5 . A knife function K C on a cake C can be used to attain an envy-free division of C between two agents: 
Generic Knife Procedure
Each agent i ∈ {A, B} selects a time t i ∈ [0, 1] such that:
Rename the agents, if needed, such that t A ≤ t B . Select any time t * ∈ [t A , t B ]. Give K C (t * ) to agent A and K C (t * ) to agent B.
This procedure obviously generates an envy-free division, since it gives to each agent a piece worth for him at least as much as the other piece. The challenge is in the first step: we must be sure that each agent i can, indeed, select a time t i such that the S-values on both sides of the knife are equal. This requires that both V S i (K C (t)) and V S i (K C (t)) change continuously as a function of t. Hence, we define: Definition 3.7. Given a family S of usable shapes, a knife-function K is called S-good if for every absolutely-continuous value-measure V , both V S (K(t)) and V S (K(t)) are continuous functions of t.
How can we find S-good knife-functions? In Appendix A, we define two different properties of knife-functions, each of which is a sufficient condition for S-goodness:
• S-smoothness means that the Lebesgue measure of K(t) is a continuous function of t, and that both K(t) ∈ S and K(t) ∈ S. For example, the knife-function in Figure 5 /a is rectanglesmooth (but not square-smooth).
• S-continuity means (informally) that all S-pieces in K(t) grow continuously and all S-pieces in K(t) shrink continuously; no S-piece with a positive area is created abruptly in K(t) and no S-piece with a positive area is destroyed abruptly in K(t). All knife-functions in Figure 5 are square-continuous (and also rectangle-continuous).
See Appendix A for formal definitions, proofs and additional examples.
With an S-good knife, the Generic Knife Procedure can be executed:
Lemma 3.8. Let C be a cake and C 0 , C 1 pieces such that:
Assume that an agent has a value function V such that:
Then there exists a time t i ∈ [0, 1] in which the utilities on both sides of the knife are equal:
Proof. When t = 0:
and when t = 1:
Since K C is S-good, by Definition 3.7 both V S (K C (t)) and V S (K C (t)) are continuous functions of t. Hence the lemma follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Geometric loss of knife functions
When a knife function K C is "stopped" at a certain time t ∈ [0, 1], it induces a partition of the cake C to the part which was already covered by the knife, K C (t), and the part not covered, K C (t). Based on this partition, the geometric loss of the knife can be defined: Definition 3.9. Let C be a cake, K C a knife function on C and S a family of pieces. Define the geometric loss of K C as:
Whenever a knife is stopped, the resulting partition has a geometric loss of at most Loss(K C , S). Therefore, we can expect such a knife to be useful for fairly dividing a cake among agents who want S-pieces.
Recall that the smallest possible Loss of a single piece is 1 (which means "no loss"); hence the smallest possible loss of a knife function is 1+1=2. Some examples are illustrated in Figure 5 , from left to right:
. Both K C (t) and its complement are rectangles so their geometric loss relative to the family of rectangles is 1. Hence Loss(K C , Rectangles) = 1 + 1 = 2. In contrast, the geometric loss of these rectangles relative to the family of squares is unbounded, so:
. For every t, K C (t) is a union of two squares and its complement is also a union of two squares. By the Cover Lemma, each such union has a geometric loss of 2 (relative to the family of squares). Hence, Loss(K C , Squares) = 2 + 2 = 4.
(c) Let C be the top-right quarter-plane and S the family of squares and quarter-planes (we consider a quarter-plane to be a square with infinite side-length). Define:
is a square and its complement can be covered by two quarter-planes, so the geometric loss of K C is 1+2=3.
(
is a square and its complement is an L-shape, similar to the L-shapes in Figure 4 , which can be covered by 3 squares. Hence,
. This is a knife-function from ∅ to C 1 ; it covers C 1 continuously from bottom to top. The partition can be covered by at most 2+1=3 rectangles, but its square-loss is not bounded.
Lemma 3.10. (Knife Lemma) Let C be a cake and C 0 , C 1 pieces such that: C 0 ⊆ C 1 ⊆ C. Let K C be an S-good knife-function from C 0 to C 1 . If there are two agents and for every agent i:
, then C can be divided using the Generic Knife Procedure (see Subsection 3.4) and every agent playing by the rules is guaranteed an envy-free share with a utility of at least:
Proof. Consider an agent, say Alice, who plays by the rules and declares a time t A for which
. Denote this equal utility by U . There are two cases: if t A ≤ t * ≤ t B , then Alice receives K C (t * ), which contains K C (t A ). Otherwise, t B ≤ t * ≤ t A , and Alice receives K C (t * ), which contains K C (t A ) (because K C is monotonically increasing). In both cases, Alice feels no envy and receives a utility of at least U . This utility is bounded from below in three ways:
by the Chooser Lemma, since the loss of the partition is at most Loss(K C , S).
Note that the Generic Knife Procedure is discrete: it does not need to continuously move the knife until an agent shouts "stop"; the agents are asked in advance in what time they would like to "stop the knife".
The Chooser Lemma and the Knife Lemma are the main tools we use to construct division procedures.
Envy-Free Division For Two agents

Squares and rectangles
Our first generic envy-free division procedure is based on a single knife function.
Lemma 4.1. (Single Knife Procedure). Let C be a cake, S a family of pieces and M ≥ 2 an integer. If there exists an S-good knife-function K C from ∅ to C with
Proof. The cake can be divided using the Generic Knife Procedure, taking C 0 = ∅ and C 1 = C. The assumptions of the Knife Lemma (3.10) hold trivially because C 0 = C \ C 1 = ∅. Hence each agent playing by the rules receives an envy-free share worth at least 1/M .
The knife function in Figure 5 /b is Square-good and its Square-loss is 4. Applying Lemma 4.1 to that knife function yields our first sub-theorem:
The generality of Lemma 4.1 allows us to get more results with no additional effort. For example:
• By the knife function of Figure 5 /b: PropEF(Square, Square pairs, 2) ≥ 1/2. I.e., if each agent has to receive a union of two squares (as is common when dividing land to settlers, e.g. one land-plot for building and another one for agriculture, etc.), then a proportional division is possible since the knife function in example (b) has a geometric loss of 2 relative to the family of square pairs.
• By Figure 5 /c: PropEF(Quarter P lane, Generalized Squares, 2) ≥ 1/3.
All bounds presented above are tight in the strong sense stated in the introduction, i.e., it is not possible to guarantee both agents a larger utility even if envy is allowed. This is obvious for the ≥ 1/2 results, since a proportionality of 1/n is the best that can be guaranteed to n agents. For the other results, the matching upper bound is proved in Appendix B ( Figure B .15/a,b).
Cubes and archipelagos
In some cases it may be difficult to find a single knife function that covers the entire cake. This is so, for example, when the cakes are multi-dimensional cubes or unions of disjoint squares. To handle such cases, the following lemma suggests a generalized division procedure employing several knife functions. (a) C has a partition with a geometric loss of at most M :
Loss(C j , S) ≤ M (b) For every j, there are S-good knife functions from ∅ to C j and from ∅ to C j (where
(c) For every part C j , the geometric loss of the knife-function on C j is at most M : Proof. C can be divided using the following procedure.
(1) Each agent chooses the part C j that gives him maximum utility. If the choices are different, then by the Chooser Corollary and condition (a), each agent receives an envy-free share worth at least 1/M , so we are done (2) If both agents chose the same part C j , then ask each agent to choose either C j or C j (where C j := C \ C j ). If the choices are different, then by the Chooser Corollary and condition (a), each agent receives an envy-free share worth at least 1/M , so we are done. If the choices are identical then there are two cases:
(3-a) Both agents chose C j . By condition (c), there exists a knife function K C j from ∅ to C j with a geometric loss of at most M . Apply the Generic Knife Procedure with that knife function. The requirements of the Knife Lemma (3.10) are satisfied since for both agents,
Hence, the Knife Lemma guarantees each agent an envy-free share worth at least 1/Loss(K C j , S) ≥ 1/M .
(3-b) Both agents chose C j . By condition (b), there exists a knife function K C j from ∅ to C j . There is no guarantee about the geometric loss of K C j , but this is fine since we will not use its geometric loss below. Apply the Generic Knife Procedure. The requirements of the Knife Lemma (3.10) are met since for both agents,
(both agents preferred C j over C j ). The Knife Lemma guarantees each agent an envy-free share with a utility of at least V S i (C \ C j ) = V S i (C j ). The fact that in step (2) both agents chose C j implies, by the Chooser Lemma, that ∀i :
Several applications of Lemma 4.2 are presented below. (c) Archipelagos: Let C be an archipelago which is a union of m disjoint rectangular islands. Then PropEF(C, Rectangles, 2) ≥ 1 m+1 . Proof : The geometric loss of the partition of C to m rectangles is obviously m < m + 1, satisfying condition (a). For each part C j , define a knife function K C j based on a line sweeping from one side of the rectangle to the other side, similar to Figure 5 /a. K C j (t) is always a rectangle. Its complement can be covered by m rectangles: one rectangle to cover C j \ K C j (t) and additional m − 1 rectangles to cover C \ C j . Hence the geometric loss of every K C j is 1 + 1 + m − 1 = m + 1, satisfying condition (c) (see Figure 6) . A similar sweeping-line knife-function can be used for the complements, satisfying condition (b).
(d) Let C be an archipelago which is a union of m disjoint square islands. Then PropEF(C, Squares, 2) ≥ 
Fat rectangles
More types of cakes can be handled by adding partition steps. Loss(C j , S) ≤ M (b) Every part C j can be further partitioned such that, if C j is replaced with its partition, then the geometric loss of the resulting partition of C is at most M , i.e. for every j there exist C 1 j , . . . , C m j j with:
(c) For every j, k, there are S-good knife functions from ∅ to C j and to C j and to C k j and to C k j .
(d) For every j, k, the geometric loss of the knife function from ∅ to C k j is at most M :
A knife function with a geometric loss of 3, proving that PropEF(C, 2 f at rectangles, 2) ≥ 1/3.
Proof. The proof uses a refinement of the procedure used to prove Lemma 4.2. Steps (1) and (2) and (3-b) are exactly the same. We have to refine case (3-a), in which both agents prefer C j over C j .
(3-a-1) Refine the partition of C by replacing C j with its sub-partition:
Let each agent choose a best part from this refined partition. If the choices are different, then by condition (b) and the Chooser Corollary, each agent receives an envy-free share worth at least 1/M . (3-a-2) If both agents chose the same part from the main partition, e.g. C j ′ for some j ′ = j, then by condition (c) there exists a knife-function from ∅ to C j (the part chosen by both agents at step 2). Apply the Generic Knife Procedure. The requirements of the Knife Lemma (3.10) are satisfied since for both agents,
(both agents prefer C j to C j ). The Knife Lemma guarantees each agent an envy-free share with utility at least V S i (C j ). This C j contains all other parts of the main partition, including C j ′ . The fact that both agents chose C j ′ in the refined partition proves, by the Chooser Lemma, that The requirements of the Knife Lemma (3.10) are satisfied since for both agents,
. Hence, the Knife Lemma guarantees each agent an envy-free share worth at least 1/Loss(
(3-a-4-b) Both agents chose C k j . By condition (c), there exists an S-good knife function from ∅ to C k j . Apply the Generic Knife Procedure. The requirements of the Knife Lemma (3.10) are met since for both agents,
The Knife Lemma guarantees each agent an envy-free share with utility at least
. The fact that in step (3-a-2) both agents chose C k j implies, by the Chooser Lemma, that
Lemma 4.3 is used to get the second part of our Theorem 1:
PropEF(R f at rectangle, R f at rectangles, 2) ≥ 1/3
Proof. The proof relies on the following geometric fact: for every R ≥ 2, an R-fat rectangle can be bisected to two R-fat rectangles using a straight line through the center of its longer sides (see Figure 7) . Apply Lemma 4.3 in the following way. Let C be an R-fat rectangle. Partition C in the middle of its longer side. The two halves are R-fat so the geometric loss of the partition is 1 + 1 < 3, satisfying condition (a). Each half can be further partitioned along its longer side to two rectangles, which are also R-fat (each of these is exactly one quarter of C). When a part is replaced by its sub-partition, the geometric loss of the resulting partition is thus 2 + 1 = 3, satisfying condition (b). Condition (c) is satisfied e.g. by knife-functions based on sweeping lines, as in Figure 5 /e. For each quarter-rectangle, there is a knife function (growing from the corner towards the center, as in Figure 7 ) with a geometric loss of 3, satisfying condition (d). Note that the impossibility results are valid when the pieces are R-fat rectangles for every finite R, while the impossibility result of the square in Figure B .15/b is valid for every R < 2. This implies that 2-fat rectangles are a good practical compromise between fatness and fairness: if we require fatter pieces (R < 2) then the proportionality guarantee drops from 1/3 to 1/4, while if we allow thinner pieces (R > 2) the proportionality remains 1/3 for all R < ∞.
Fat cakes of arbitrary shape
Our most general result involves cakes that are arbitrary Borel sets. The result is proved for cakes of any dimensionality; Figure 8 illustrates the proof for d = 2 dimensions.
Theorem 1(c).
For every R ≥ 1, If C is R-fat and S is the family of 2R-fat pieces then:
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 4.2 (the Single Partition Procedure). We show a partition of C to two pieces and a knife-function on each piece. Scale, rotate and translate the cake C such that the largest cube contained in C is B − = [−1, 1] d (Figure 8/a) . By definition of fatness (see Subsection 1.1), C is now contained in a cube B + of side-length at most 2R.
Using the hyperplane x = 0, bisect the cube B − to two 2-by-1 boxes
This hyperplane also bisects C to two parts, C 1 and C 2 (Figure 8/b) . Every C j contains B j which contains a cube with a side-length of 1. Every C j is of course still contained in B + which is cube with a side-length of 2R. Hence every C j is 2R-fat. Hence the geometric loss of the partition C = C 1 ⊔ C 2 , relative to the family or 2R-fat objects, is 2, satisfying condition (a) of Lemma 4.2.
For every j ∈ {1, 2}, define the following knife function K j on C j (see Figure 8 /c,d): • For t ∈ [0, 1 2 ], K j (t) = (B j ) 2t , i.e., the box B i dilated by a factor of 2t. Hence K j (0) = ∅ and
is any knife-function from B j to C j with continuous Lebesgue-measure (see Subsection A.1 for a proof that such a function exists). , 1] it contains B j and is contained in the cube B + . C \ K j (t) is also 2R-fat, since it contains B 3−j and is contained in B + . Moreover, the Lebesgue measure of K j (t) is a continuous function of t. Hence, by Subsection A.1, K j is an S-good knife function, satisfying condition (b) of Lemma 4.2.
Since both K j and K j are 2R-fat, the geometric loss of K j relative to the family of 2R-fat shapes is 1 + 1 = 2, satisfying condition (c) of Lemma 4.2.
All conditions of Lemma 4.2 are satisfied, and its conclusion is exactly the claimed theorem.
Theorem 1(c) implies that we can satisfy the two main fairness requirements: proportionality and envy-freeness, while keeping the allocated pieces sufficiently fat. The fatness guarantee means that each allotted piece: (a) contains a sufficiently large square, (b) is contained in a sufficiently small square. In the context of land division, these guarantees can be interpreted as follows: (a) Each land-plot has sufficient room for building a large house in a convenient shape (square); (b) The parts of the land that are valuable to the agent are close together, since they are bounded in a sufficiently small square.
Finally we note that a different technique leads to a version of Theorem 1(c) which guarantee that the pieces are not only 2R-fat but also convex (if the original cake is convex); hence an agent can walk in a straight line from his square house to his valuable spots without having to enter or circumvent the neighbor's fields. See Appendix C for details.
Between envy-freeness end proportionality
For all cakes C and families of usable pieces S studied in this section, we proved that there exists a positive constant p such that PropEF(C, S, 2) ≥ p. Moreover, for the cases in which p < 1/2, we proved in Appendix B that Prop(C, S, 2) ≤ p (for the cases in which p = 1/2 the latter inequality is obvious). Since PropEF(C, S, 2) ≤ PropEF(C, S, 2) always, we get that for all settings studied here:
In other words, in these cases, envy-freeness is compatible with the best possible partial-proportionality.
It is an open question whether this equality holds for every combination of cakes C and families S.
What can we say about the relation between proportionality and envy-freeness for arbitrary C and S? In addition to the trivial upper bound PropEF(C, S, 2) ≤ Prop(C, S, 2), we have the following lower bound: Lemma 4.4. For every cake C and family S:
Proof. Let p = Prop(C, S, 2) and e = inf s∈S PropEF(s, S, 2). The following meta-procedure yields an envy-free partition of C in which the utility of each agent is at least p · e.
By the definition of Prop(C, S, 2), there exists an S-allocation X = (X 1 , X 2 ) with a proportionality of at least p, i.e, each agent i receives an S-piece X i with V i (X i ) ≥ p.
Ask each agent whether he envies the other agent and proceed accordingly: (a) If no agent envies the other agent, then the partition is already envy-free. The utility of each agent is at least p, which is at least p · e (since e ≤ 1).
(b) If both agents envy each other, then let them switch the pieces. The resulting partition is envy-free and the utility of each agent is more than p ≥ p · e.
(c) The remaining case is that only one agent envies the other agent. W.l.o.g, assume it is agent 1 who envies agent 2. This means that the S-piece X 2 has a utility of at least p to both agents. By the assumptions of the lemma, since X 2 ∈ S, PropEF(X 2 , S, 2) ≥ e. Therefore, there exists an envy-free S-allocation of X 2 in which the utility of each agent i is at least e · V i (X 2 ) ≥ e · p.
So by previous results we have the following partial-compatibility results for every cake C:
5. Envy-Free Division For n agents
The one-dimensional procedure
Existence of envy-free allocations in one dimension was first proved by Stromquist [43] . A procedure for finding such allocations was developed by Simmons and first described by Su [45] . Our procedure for n agents is a generalization of that procedure. We briefly describe the 1-dimensional procedure below.
The cake is the 1-dimensional interval [0, 1] and S is the family of intervals. A partition of the cake to n intervals can be described by a vector of length n whose elements are the lengths of the intervals. The sum of all lengths in a partition is 1, so the set of all partitions is an (n − 1)-dimensional simplex in R n . The procedure proceeds as follows (see Figure 9 ): (a) Preparation. Triangulate the simplex of partitions to a collection of (n − 1)-dimensional sub-simplexes. Assign each vertex of the triangulation to one of the n agents, such that in each sub-simplex, all n agents are represented. Su shows that there always exists such a triangulation.
(b) Evaluation. Recall that each vertex of the triangulation corresponds to a partition of the cake to n intervals. For each vertex, ask its assigned agent: "if the cake is partitioned according to this vertex, which piece would you prefer?". The answer is an integer between 1 and n; label that vertex with that integer.
The labeling created in step (b) has a special structure. First, each of the n main vertexes of the large simplex corresponds to a partition in which a single piece i ∈ {1, . . . , n} encompasses the entire cake and all other pieces are empty. Any agent prefers the entire cake over an empty piece, so this vertex will surely be labeled by i (see Figure 9 /b, where the three vertexes of the large triangle are labeled by 1, 2 and 3). Moreover, each point on the segment between vertex i 1 and vertex i 2 corresponds to a partition in which the cake is divided between pieces i 1 and i 2 , and all other pieces are empty. Therefore, each such point will be labeled by either i 1 or i 2 . The same is true in any number of dimensions: in each face of the simplex, all interior points are labeled by one of the labels of the main vertexes that span that face. A labeling that has such a structure is called a Sperner labeling. By Sperner's lemma, any triangulation with a Sperner labeling has a fully-labeled sub-simplex, in which all vertexes are labeled differently.
(c) Refinement. Steps (a) and (b) can be repeated again and again, each time with a finer triangulation. This yields an infinite sequence of fully-labeled simplexes. By compactness of the simplex, there is a subsequence that converges to a single point. By the continuity of the agents' valuations, this point corresponds to a partition in which each of the n agents prefers a different piece. By definition, this partition is envy-free.
Note that the above procedure is infinite -the envy-free partition is found only at the limit of an infinite sequence. In fact, Stromquist [44] proved that when n ≥ 3, an envy-free partition to n agents with connected pieces cannot be found by a finite procedure. Therefore, Simmons' infinite procedure is the best that can be hoped for. Deng and Qi and Saberi [18] show that an approximately-envy-free division can be found in bounded time. For example, suppose that an interval is divided among several agents and they all agree that a 1 centimeter movement of the border between their plots is irrelevant. Then the simplex of partitions can be divided to subsimplices of side-length 1 cm. If the total length of the cake is L centimeters, then a fully-labeled simplex can be found using O(L n−2 ) queries [18, Theorem 5] . All points in that simplex correspond to a division that is approximately-envy-free up to the agents' tolerance.
Knife tuples
Both Stromquist's existence proof and the Simmons-Su and the Deng-Qi-Saberi algorithms do not work directly on the cake -they work on the unit simplex, each point of which represents a cake-partition. Therefore, we can extend these algorithms to two dimensions if we find an appropriate way to map each point of the unit simplex to a two-dimensional cake-partition.
Our main tool is a knife-tuple -an extension of the knife-function defined in Definition 3.6.
Definition 5.1. Given a cake C, an n-knife-tuple on C is a vector of n functions (K 1 , . . . , K n ), which is a function from ∆ n (the (n − 1)-dimensional unit-simplex in R n ) to the partitions of C, such that for every nonempty subset of indexes I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, if:
then the pieces whose indexes are in I form a partition of the cake and the other pieces are empty:
In particular, at endpoint #i of the simplex, piece #i comprises the entire cake. I.e, if t i = 1 and
Knife-tuples can be constructed from knife-functions.
Lemma 5.2. Let C be a cake and K a knife-function from ∅ to C. Define functions K 1 , K 2 :
Proof. We verify the knife-tuple property for all nonempty subset of indexes:
• On the unit simplex, t 1 + t 2 = 1,
• When t 1 = 1 and t 2 = 0,
• When t 2 = 1 and
Longer knife-tuples can be constructed recursively, by replacing an element of an existing knifetuple with two elements separated by a knife-function. We exemplify this construction with a 3-knife-tuple. Lemma 5.3. Let C be a cake and (K 1 , K 2 ) a 2-knife-tuple on C. Suppose that, for every t 1 and every t 2 > 0, we have a knife-function K t 1 ,t 2 from ∅ to K 2 (t 1 , t 2 ). Then, replacing the function K 2 with two complementary functions K ′ 2 and K ′ 3 gives a 3-knife-tuple
satisfies the knife-tuple property for all nonempty subsets of indexes. Recall that the knife-tuple property of the original (K 1 , K 2 ) implies that:
• When t 1 = 1 and t 2 = t 3 = 0,
• When t 3 = 1 and
• When t 1 + t 2 = 1 and
• When t 1 + t 3 = 1 and t 2 = 0,
• When t 2 + t 3 = 1 and
So to build a 3-knife-tuple, we start with a single knife-function on C that cuts it to K 1 ⊔ K 2 . Then, for every point in time, we use another knife-function on K 2 that cuts it to K ′ 2 ⊔ K ′ 3 . Alternatively, we can use a knife-function on K 1 that cuts it to K ′ 1 ⊔ K ′ 3 ; the proof is entirely analogous.
An example of a 3-knife-tuple is shown in Figure 10 . There, the first knife-function (K 1 ≡ K ′ 1 ) is a growing pair-of-squares, identical to the knife-function in Figure 5 /b. K 2 is its complement (which is also a pair-of-squares). For every point in time, the second knife-function (K ′ 2 ) is a growing union-of-four-squares. It starts at an empty set and grows until it covers all of K 2 . K ′ 3 is the remainder, which is also a union of four squares.
The previous lemma can be generalized to create knife-tuples of arbitrary length.
Lemma 5.4. Let C be a cake and (K 1 , . . . , K n ) an n-knife-tuple on C. Suppose that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for every t 1 , . . . , t n where t i > 0, we have a knife-function K t 1 ,...,t i ,...,tn from ∅ to K i (t 1 , . . . , t i , . . . , t n ). Then, replacing the index i with two indexes i1 and i2 and replacing the function K i with two complementary functions K ′ i1 and K ′ i2 gives an (n + 1)-knife-tuple
satisfies the knife-tuple property for every nonempty subset of indexes, I ′ . There are four cases, depending on whether I ′ contains i1 or i2 or both.
• i1 / ∈ I ′ and i2 / ∈ I ′ . Then,
• i1 ∈ I ′ and i2 / ∈ I ′ . When
. . , t n ). Define an alternative subset of indexes: I := I ′ \ {i1} ∪ {i}. Then, ⊔ j∈I ′ K ′ j = ⊔ j∈I K j = C by the knife-tuple property of (K 1 , . . . , K n ), and K ′ i2 = ∅ by definition.
• i2 ∈ I ′ and i1 / ∈ I ′ . When . . . , t i2 , . . . , t n ). Define an alternative subset of indexes: I := I ′ \ {i2} ∪ {i}. Then, ⊔ j∈I ′ K ′ j = ⊔ j∈I K j = C by the knife-tuple property of (K 1 , . . . , K n ), and K ′ i1 = ∅ by definition.
• i2 ∈ I ′ and i1 ∈ I ′ . Note that when
Definitions 3.9 and 3.7 can be naturally generalized from a knife-function to a knife-tuple: Definition 5.5. The geometric-loss of a knife-tuple (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is the supremum geometric loss of the resulting partitions:
Loss(K j (t 1 , . . . , t n ), S)
In Figure 10 , K ′ 1 can be covered by two squares and K ′ 2 and K ′ 3 can be covered by four squares each, so the square-geometric-loss of this 3-knife-tuple is 10. Definition 5.6. A knife-tuple (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is called S-good if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and every absolutely-continuous value-measure V , the function V S (K i (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ) is a continuous function of t 1 , . . . , t n . 
is filled with horizontal blue lines, K ′ 2 (·) is filled with vertical green lines and K ′ 3 (·) is blank.
In the knife-tuple of Figure 10 , the squares meet only at their corners, no square is created or destroyed abruptly, so the knife-tuple is square-good. This can be proved formally as in Appendix A.2; the details are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Lemma 5.7. Let C be a cake and S a family of pieces. If there is an S-good n-knife-tuple on C with a geometric loss of at most M , then:
Proof. Use the Simmons-Su procedure described in Subsection 5.1. The Preparation step (a) is exactly the same. In the Evaluation step (b), for each vertex (t 1 , . . . , t n ) of the triangulation, use the n-knife-tuple to create the partition: K 1 (t 1 , . . . , t n ), . . . , K n (t 1 , . . . , t n ). Ask the owner of that vertex (e.g. agent i) to indicate its favorite piece in this partition, namely: arg max j∈{1,...,n}
and label that vertex with the agent's reply. By the properties of a knife-tuple, whenever t j = 0, K j = ∅, so V S i (K j ) = 0, so the agent will never reply j. Therefore, the resulting labeling is a Sperner labeling, so a fully-labeled sub-simplex exists.
By repeating steps (a) and (b) infinitely many times with finer and finer triangulations, we get a subsequence of fully-labeled triangles that converges to a single point. Because the knife-tuple is S-good, all agents' S-value functions are continuous, so the limit point corresponds to an envy-free partition. The loss of the knife-tuple is at most M , so the proportionality of the limit partition is at least 1/M . 12 We now apply Lemma 5.7 to prove our Theorem 2.
Square cake and square pieces
Theorem 2(a). For every n ≥ 1:
12 When n = 3, the three-knives procedure of Stromquist [43] can be used instead of Simmons' procedure.
Proof. For every n which is a power of 2, we construct an n-knife-tuple (K 1 , . . . , K n ), in which for every (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ ∆ n , and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} for which t j > 0, K j (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a union of at most n squares. Hence, the partition induced by (K 1 , . . . , K n ) has a geometric loss of n · n = n 2 .
The construction is recursive. The base is n = 2. Take the knife-function in Figure 5 /b (a union of two corner-squares growing towards the center). By Lemma 5.2, it defines a 2-knife-tuple which we denote by: (K 1 , K 2 ). For each t 1 and t 2 , K 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) and K 2 (t 1 , t 2 ) are square-pairs (unions of two squares).
Consider next the case n = 4. In every square-pair in the above 2-knife-tuple, define a knifefunction as shown in Figure 10 -a union of four corner-squares growing from opposite corners towards the center. By Lemma 5.4, we can replace
) is a union of four squares.
After l steps, we have a 2 l -knife-tuple in which each component is a union of 2 l squares. We split each component using a knife-function made of a union of 2 l+1 squares growing from opposite corners. This gives a new, 2 l+1 -knife-tuple in which each component is a union of 2 l+1 squares. After log 2 n steps, we get the desired n-knife-tuple.
This knife-tuple is square-good since no squares are created or destroyed abruptly; this is apparent in the illustration, since the squares from opposite sides meet only at their corners. We suppress a formal proof of this geometric fact.
When n is not a power of two, it can be rounded to the next power of two -2 ⌈log 2 n⌉ . The geometric loss is then at most 2 2⌈log 2 n⌉ , which is always less than 4n 2 .
Theorem 2(b).
If C is an R-fat rectangle and S the family of R-fat rectangles then:
Proof. Scale the coordinate system such that C becomes a square. Use Theorem 2(a) and get a division with square pieces. Scale the coordinate system back. Now the pieces are R-fat rectangles.
We do not know if the 1/(4n 2 ) lower bound is asymptotically tight. The best upper bound currently known [41] is Prop(Square, squares, n) ≤ 1/(2n). Moreover, there is a procedure for non-envy-free division that proves Prop(Square, squares, n) ≥ 1/(4n − 4). We do not know if it is possible to attain an envy-free division with a proportionality of 1/O(n).
In the following subsection we show that it is possible to attain an envy-free and proportional division for every n, in return to a compromise on the family of usable pieces.
Fat cakes of arbitrary shape
Theorem 2(c). Let C be a d-dimensional R-fat cake and n ≥ 2 an integer. Let S be the family of mR-fat pieces, where m be the smallest integer such that n ≤ m d (i.e. m = ⌈n 1/d ⌉). Then: PropEF(C, S, n) = 1/n Proof. The proof is illustrated in Figure 11 for the case of d = 2 dimensions. Let C be an R-fat ddimensional cake. By definition of fatness it contains a cube B − of side-length x and it is contained in a parallel cube B + of side-length R · x, for some x > 0. 
Figure 11: Dividing a general R-fat cake to n = 3 people. K 1 is filled with horizontal lines, K 2 is filled with vertical lines and K 3 is white. Note that each of these three pieces is 2R-fat, where R is the fatness of the original cake.
Denote by B − the cake outside the enclosed cube, i.e:
Define the following knife function K on C (see Figure 11 ):
• For t ∈ [0, • t) ], i.e., the cake not yet covered by the knife is B −1 dilated by a factor proportional to the remaining time. Hence K(1) = C.
By Lemma 5.2, K induces a 2-knife-tuple (K 1 , K 2 ) where K 1 := K and K 2 := C \ K 1 . For every t 1 , t 2 with t 1 + t 2 = 1, K 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) is mR-fat:
, 1], K 1 contains the cube B 1 , whose side-length is x/m, and is contained in the cube B + , whose side-length is x · R.
and K 2 (t 1 , t 2 ) is also mR-fat: 3 ], K 2 contains e.g. the cube B n , whose side-length is x/m, and is contained in the larger cube B + , whose side-length is x · R.
• When t 1 ∈ [ 2 3 , 1], K 2 contains a dilated B n and it is contained in a dilated B − ; since they are dilated by the same factor, the ratio between their side-lengths is always m.
For every t 1 , t 2 with t 1 + t 2 = 1, we now define a knife-function K t 1 ,t 2 from ∅ to K 2 (t 1 , t 2 ). K t 1 ,t 2 is analogous to K but uses the sub-cube B 2 . This is possible because:
The function K t 1 ,t 2 is defined as follows:
is any knife-function from B 2 to K 2 \ B −2 with continuous Lebesgue measure.
By Lemma 5.3, this induces a 3-knife-tuple (
. To define an n-knife-tuple, select arbitrary n pieces out of the m 2 pieces and proceed in a similar way. All components in the knife-tuple are mR-fat, and their Lebesgue measure changes continuously. Therefore, by the proofs in Subsection A.1, the knife-tuple is S-good, as required by Lemma 5.7. Figure 11 shows an example of the construction for d = 2 dimensions and n = 3 agents. Here m = ⌈ √ 3⌉ = 2 so each agent receives an envy-free 2R-fat land-plot with a utility of at least 1/3. Theorem 2(c) implies that we can guarantee proportionality by compromising on the fatness of the pieces -allowing the pieces to be thinner than the cake by a factor of ⌈n 1/d ⌉. This factor is asymptotically optimal even when envy is allowed:
Proof. Let δ, ǫ be small positive constants. Let C be a cake with the following two components:
• The left component is a cube with all sides of length 1;
• The right component is a box with one side of length R and the other sides of length δ.
See Figure 12 for an illustration for d = 2. C is contained in a cube of side-length R + 1 and it contains a cube of side-length 1, so it is (R + 1)-fat. C represents a desert with the following water sources:
• The left cube contains n − 1 + ǫ water units;
• A small disc at the end of the right box contains 1 − ǫ water units.
C has to be divided among n agents whose value functions are proportional to the amount of water.
To get a proportional division, each agent must receive exactly 1 unit of water. This means that at least one piece, e.g. X i , must overlap both the right pool and the left pool. The smallest cube containing X i has a side-length of at least R. For the largest cube contained in X i , there are two options:
• If the largest contained cube is in the left side, then its side-length must be at most
, since it must contain at most 1 unit of water.
• If the largest contained cube is in the right side, then its side-length must be at most δ. If δ is sufficiently small (in particular, δ <
), then the piece X i is not m ′ R-fat for every m ′ ≤ (n − 1) 1/d . This means that, if all pieces must be m ′ R-fat, a proportional division is impossible.
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the problem of fairly dividing a cake to agents whose utility functions depend on geometric shape. Our main contributions are several generic division procedures for envy-free division. For two agents, our procedures have the best possible partial-proportionality guarantees in various geometric scenarios. For n agents, our procedures guarantee a positive partial proportionality.
The tools developed in this paper are generic and can work for cakes and pieces of other geometric shapes. In fact, our tools reduce the envy-free division problem to a geometric problem -the problem of finding appropriate knife functions.
Some topics not covered in the present paper are:
• Utility functions that takes into account both the value contained in the best usable piece and the total value of the piece, e.g.:
, where w is some constant.
• Absolute size constraints on the usable pieces instead of the relative fatness constraints studied here, e.g. let S be the family of all rectangles with length and width of at least 10 meters.
• Personal geometric preferences -letting each agent i specify a different family S i of usable pieces.
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A. Geometric conditions for S-good knife functions
Recall Definition 3.7:
Given a cake C and a family S, a knife function K C is called S-good if for every absolutely-continuous value-measure V , both V S (K C (t)) and V S (K C (t)) are continuous functions of t.
This section presents two different geometric properties of a knife function K C , each of which guarantees that it is S-good.
A.1. S-smoothness
The first property is simple: both the region covered and the region not covered by the knife function should always return S-pieces whose Lebesgue measure changes continuously.
Definition A.1. Let S be a family of pieces. A knife function K(t) is called S-smooth if:
(a) The Lebesgue measure of K(t) (and hence of K(t)) is a continuous function of t, and: (b) for all t, both K(t) ∈ S and K(t) ∈ S.
Lemma A.2. If V is a measure absolutely-continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and K is an S-smooth knife-function, then the real functions V S • K and V S • K are continuous.
Proof. The measure V is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and Lebesgue(K(t)) is a continuous function of t by condition (a). Hence, V (K(t)) is also a continuous function of t.
is also a continuous function of t. An analogous proof applies to V S (K(t)).
The knife function in Figure 5 /a is Rectangle-smooth but not Square-smooth. The other knife functions in that figure are neither Rectangle-smooth nor Square-smooth (e.g in Figure 5 /c, K(t) is not a rectangle).
We now prove a useful lemma that will help us find S-smooth functions. Recall that Ssmoothness has two conditions: Lebesgue(K(t)) should be continuous, and K(t) should be in S. We now focus on the first condition -continuity of Lebesgue(K(t)).
Given two bounded Borel subsets of R d , A and B, does there always exist a knife function K from A to B such that Lebesgue(K(t)) is continuous? By the monotonicity of a knife-function, a necessary condition is that A ⊂ B. By the following lemma, this condition is also sufficient. Clearly, K(0) = A, K(1) = B and K is (weakly) monotonically increasing. Hence, K is a knife-function from A to B. The continuity of Lebesgue(K(t)) follows from the fact that Lebesgue(D * (t)) is continuous and for every ∆t:
We call any function satisfying the requirements of Lemma A.3 a knife-function with continuous Lebesgue-measure. Any S-smooth knife-function has continuous Lebesgue-measure. Any knifefunction with continuous Lebesgue-measure in which K(t) ∈ S and K(t) ∈ S is S-smooth.
A.2. S-continuity
The second property is more involved. The knife function may return pieces that are not from S. However, it must change in a way that S-pieces are not created or destroyed abruptly, but rather grow or shrink in a continuous manner. Definition A.4. A piece s is called a ǫ-predecessor of a piece s ′ if s ⊆ s ′ and Lebesgue(s ′ \ s) < ǫ.
Definition A.5. Let S be a family of pieces. A knife function K(t) is called S-continuous if for every ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that, for all t and t ′ having |t ′ − t| < δ:
(a) Every S-piece s t ′ ⊆ K(t ′ ) has an ǫ-predecessor S-piece s t ⊆ K(t).
(b) Every S-piece s t ′ ⊆ K(t ′ ) has an ǫ-predecessor S-piece s t ⊆ K(t).
Lemma A.6. If V is a measure absolutely-continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and K is an S-continuous knife function, then the real functions V S •K and V S •K are uniformly-continuous.
Proof. Given ǫ ′ > 0, we show the existence of δ > 0 such that, for every t, t ′ , if |t ′ − t| < δ then
Given ǫ ′ , by the continuity of V , there is an ǫ > 0 such that:
Given that ǫ, by the S-continuity of K there is a δ > 0 such that, if |t ′ − t| < δ, then every S-piece s t ′ ⊆ K(t ′ ) has an ǫ-predecessor S-piece s t ⊆ K(t). This means that s t ⊆ s t ′ and:
The latter inequality is true for every S-piece s t ′ ⊆ K(t ′ ), so it is also true for the supremum:
By definition, the S-value is the supremum, so:
By symmetric arguments (replacing the roles of t and t ′ ),
)| < ǫ ′ as we wanted to prove. An analogous proof applies to the function V S • K.
The following lemma demonstrates how the existence of S-continuous functions can be proved.
Lemma A.7. Let S be the family of d-dimensional cubes. For every bounded cake C in R d , there exists an S-continuous knife-function from ∅ to C. The solid line describes the knife location at time t; the dotted line describes its location at time t + δ. The dotted squares are squares contained in H(t + δ); the solid squares are their predecessors in H(t).
At the bottom, the side-length of the solid square is smaller than the dotted square by exactly δ.
At the top, the side-length of the solid square is smaller than the dotted square by less than δ.
Proof. Since C is bounded, it can be moved and scaled such that it is contained in the unit cube [0, 1] d . For every t ∈ [0, 1], Let H(t) be the half-space defined by: x < t. Define: K C (t) := H(t)∩C. Clearly, K C (0) = ∅, K C (1) = C and K C is (weakly) monotonically increasing. Hence, K C is a knife-function from ∅ to C. The proof that K C is S-continuous is based on the following geometric fact: for every cube s t ′ contained in the half-space H(t + δ), there exists a cube s t ⊆ s t ′ contained in the half-space H(t), such that the side-length of s t is smaller than that of s t ′ by at most δ (it is smaller by exactly δ when s t ′ is adjacent to the rightmost side of H(t + δ) and parallel to the axes; see Figure A .13 for an illustration of the two-dimensional case). Suppose s t ′ is also contained in C. Since C is contained in the unit cube, the side-length of s t ′ is at most 1. Therefore, the area of s t is smaller than that of s t ′ by at most 1
Consider now the definition of S-continuity. For every ǫ > 0, take δ := ǫ/d, let t ′ = t + δ and let s t ′ be an S-piece contained in K C (t ′ ). By definition of K C , s t ′ is contained in both C and H(t ′ ). By the geometric fact, s t ′ has an ǫ-predecessor s t that is contained in H(t). Since s t ⊆ s t ′ , it is also contained in C. Hence, it is contained in K C (t).
Using similar arguments, it is possible to prove that the function K C described above is Scontinuous also when S is the family of boxes or fat boxes. Full characterization of the the families S for which K C is S-continuous is an interesting question that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
A.3. Examples
The knife-function in Figure 5 The knife-functions in Figure 5 /b,c,d,e are S-continuous but not S-smooth. Thus one may think that S-continuity is more permissive than S-smoothness. But this is not the case: S-continuity and S-smoothness are two independent properties. To see this, let S ′ be the family of rectangle-pairs (defined as unions of two rectangles). The function K C defined in the previous paragraph (and Figure A. 14) is S ′ -smooth, because both K C (t) and K C (t) are rectangle-pairs. However, K C is not S ′ -continuous because some rectangle-pairs (e.g. 
A.4. Conclusion
We proved two independent sufficient conditions for S-goodness. Combining Lemmas A.2 and A.6 gives:
Corollary A.8. If a knife-function is either S-smooth or S-continuous (or both), then it is S-good.
Each of the two conditions, S-smoothness and S-continuity, is sufficient but not necessary for S-goodness.
B. Upper bounds on proportionality
To complement the positive results presented in Section 4, we present here some negative results -upper bounds on the attainable proportionality level.
The following generic technique is used in all impossibility results. Assume that C is a desert with M water-pools. Consider two agents whose value measure is proportional to the amount of water in their land-plot. Suppose it is possible to give each agent an S-piece containing a single water pool, but impossible to give both agents more than one pool since there is room for at most a single S-piece touching two pools. Therefore, at least one agent has at most one pool and a utility of at most 1/M . The arrangements of pools and the corresponding upper bounds are presented in Figure B .15.
C. Convex version of Subsection 4.4
The following theorem is a variant of Theorem 1(c) in which the cake must be convex and the pieces are guaranteed to be convex. The convexity requirement, while seemingly simple, implies that we cannot use the usual knife functions anymore. For example, if C is a circle then every knife function (which must be a straight line to keep the pieces convex) must start with an infinitely slim piece. Hence we must use another technique which can be called a rotating-knife. Consider a line passing through the origin at angle θ ∈ [0 • , 360 • ] from the x axis (see Figure  C.16 ). This line cuts the contained square B − into two quadrangles, each of which contains a square with side-length 1. Because C is convex, this line also cuts the boundary of C at exactly two points, splitting C to two convex pieces. Each of these two pieces is 2R-fat since it contains a square with side-length 1 and it is contained in B + whose side-length is 2R.
Let W (θ) be the value of the piece for agent #1 at the left-hand side of the line when facing at angle θ. Because the value measure is continuous, W is continuous. When θ rotates by 180 • , the piece that was at the left-hand side is now at the right-hand side and vice versa (e.g. when θ = 0 • the left-hand side is above the line and when θ = 180 • the right-hand side is above the line). Hence if W (θ) > 1/2 then W (180 • + θ) = 1 − W (θ) < 1/2 and vice versa. Hence by the continuity of W there must be a θ for which W (θ) = 1/2. Cut the cake at the line in angle θ. Let agent #2 choose a piece and give the other piece to agent #1. Now both agents have a piece which is convex and 2R-fat and their value is at least 1/2. So far we have not managed to generalize the rotating-knife technique to more than two agents.
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